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Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.3(b), movants Kathleen
Clark, Deborah Coleman, Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Monroe Freedman, Stephen Gillers, Bruce Green, Donald Hilliker, David B.
Isbell, John M. Levy, Margaret Love, Steven Lubet, Susan Martyn, James Moliterno, Deborah Rhode, Ronald Rotunda, George
Rutherglen, Theodore J. Schneyer, Charles W. Wolfram and
Fordham University’s Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics
respectfully request leave to ﬁle the attached brief amicus curiae
in support of petitioner. Movants have sought consent for their
appearance as amici curiae from Petitioner Walter Mickens, Jr.
and Respondent John Taylor, Warden of the Sussex I State
Prison. Petitioner has consented, but Respondent has not.
Movants are fourteen law professors who are experts in legal
ethics, four legal practitioners who are or have served as chairs of
the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, and a university ethics center. Kathleen Clark,
Professor at Washington University School of Law, has taught
legal ethics since 1993. Deborah Coleman, Partner at Hahn
Loeser & Parks, is a former chair of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Earl C. Dudley, Jr.,
Professor at University of Virginia School of Law, is a member of
the Virginia State Bar Committee on Professionalism. Monroe
Freedman, Howard Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor of
Legal Ethics at Hofstra University Law School, has taught legal
ethics since 1966 and is the author of UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS (1998). Stephen Gillers, Professor at New York
University School of Law, has taught legal ethics since 1978, and
is the author of a casebook, REGULATION OF LAWYERS (5th ed.
1998). Bruce Green, Stein Professor at Fordham University
School of Law and Director of the Louis Stein Center for Ethics,
has taught legal ethics since 1987. Donald Hilliker, Partner at
McDermott Will & Emery is the present chair of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. David
B. Isbell, Senior Counsel at Covington & Burling, is a former
chair of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility and teaches professional responsibility at Georgetown University Law Center. John M. Levy, Professor at the
Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the College of William and
Mary and Director of the Graduate Program in the American
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Legal System, has taught legal ethics since 1976 and is author of
ETHICS OF THE LAWYER’S WORK (1993). Margaret Love, Of
Counsel at Brand & Frulla, is a former chair of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Steven
Lubet, Professor of Law at Northwestern University and Director of Northwestern’s Program on Advocacy and Professionalism,
has taught ethics since 1984 and is coauthor of the course book
EXERCISES AND PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(2d ed. 2001) and coauthor of the treatise JUDICIAL CONDUCT
AND ETHICS (3d ed. 2000). Susan Martyn, Professor at University
of Toledo College of Law, has taught legal ethics since 1977.
James Moliterno, Professor at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law
at the College of William and Mary and Director of its Center for
the Teaching of Legal Ethics, has taught legal ethics since 1984,
and is author of CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (1999) and ETHICS OF THE LAWYER’S WORK
(1993). Deborah Rhode, Ernest W. McFarland Professor at Stanford Law School and Director of the Keck Center on Legal Ethics and the Legal Profession, has taught legal ethics since 1979,
and is author of the casebook, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD (2d ed. 1998) and co-author
of the casebook, LEGAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1995). Ronald Rotunda,
Albert E. Jenner Jr. Professor at University of Illinois School of
Law, has taught legal ethics since 1974, and is co-author of the
casebook, P ROFESSIONAL R ESPONSIBILITY (7th ed. 2000).
George Rutherglen, O.M. Vicars Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law, is the Director of Graduate Program for Judges. Theodore J. Schneyer, Milton O. Riepe Professor of Law at the University of Arizona James E. Rogers College
of Law, is the author of THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY (2d
ed. 1976). Charles W. Wolfram, Charles Frank Reavis Sr. Professor Emeritus at Cornell Law School, has taught legal ethics since
1974, is the author of the treatise, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS
(1986), and was the Chief Reporter for the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (American Law
Institute 1999). The Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics,
based at Fordham University School of Law, sponsors programs,
develops publications, supports scholarship on contemporary
issues of law and ethics, and encourages professional and public
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institutions to integrate moral perspectives into their work. Over
the past decade, the Stein Center and afﬁliated Fordham Law
faculty have examined the ethical dimensions of the administration of criminal justice, including issues of conﬂicts of interest.
The potential Amici have an interest in ensuring that this
Court recognize the fundamental and critical importance of the
duty of loyalty to the lawyer-client relationship and the fair and
impartial administration of justice in the adversarial system.
Amici focus on four issues that support Mickens’ Brief. First,
the historical and universal importance of the duty of loyalty in
shaping the ethical duties of counsel in the United States. Second, the nature of conﬂicts of interest and the appropriate analysis for determining when a conﬂict of interest exists. Third, the
practical and philosophical error in importing an adverse effect
test into the Court’s Sixth Amendment analysis in the circumstances of this case. Fourth, and ﬁnally, the fundamental analytical error in the Fourth Circuit’s adverse impact analysis, given the
nature and effect of conﬂicts of interest.
Based upon the above, movants respectfully request that the
Court accept their attached brief for ﬁling.
Respectfully submitted,

Dated: July 19, 2001

LAWRENCE J. FOX*
DAVID J. KESSLER
Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP
One Logan Square
18th and Cherry Streets
Philadelphia, PA 19103-6996
(215) 988-2700
* Counsel of Record
Counsel for Amici Curiae
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INTEREST OF AMICI1
The interest of Amici is set forth in the accompanying
motion for leave to ﬁle this brief amicus curiae.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is the view of amici that a conﬂict exists when counsel has
other interests that pose a substantial risk of materially and
adversely affecting the representation of the client. In the present
case, no matter by what standard Saunders’ representation of
Mickens is judged, (1) Saunders was laboring under a conﬂict of
interest that must be cognizable under this Court’s Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance standard; (2) this conﬂict was
unwaiveable; and (3) under the circumstances here, as a matter
of legal ethics and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, Mickens
should not be obliged to demonstrate any “adverse” effect. It is
further amici’s view that the en banc majority’s conclusion that
Mickens failed to prove the necessary adverse affect demonstrates why that burden, if placed on defendants whose counsel
labors under a conﬂict of interest, will result in many defendants
receiving unremedied ineffective assistance of counsel. In any
event, the adverse effect on Mickens in this case was profound
and requires a new trial.
ARGUMENT
No servant can serve two masters: for either he will
hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to
the one, and despise the other.
— Luke 16:13 (King James).
As one of the oldest statements forbidding a conﬂict of interest, the most important aspect of the above Biblical passage is
that it is neither cautionary nor aspirational — it is a simple prohibition. Amici consider that the wisdom of this ancient dictum
has informed the profession’s long-standing adherance to the
1. Amici curiae state, pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 37.6, that this brief was not
authored in any part by counsel for any party, and that no person or entity made
any monetary contributions to its preparation or submission.
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principle of client loyalty and should inform this Court’s deliberation of this important case.
*
*
*
To execute a man who was represented at his trial and ﬁrst
appeal by a lawyer who did not disclose that he represented the
victim up until his death is the very antithesis of our system’s
commitment that a person facing loss of money or freedom, let
alone life, is guaranteed his very own champion. To allow the
execution to occur when the trial judge was on notice of the conﬂict, compounds the betrayal; the defendant then has been
denied not only the loyalty of his lawyer, but also the guardianship of the court. But perhaps of even greater signiﬁcance to
amici — indeed, what has brought amici together to present this
brief — is the concern that to permit Mickens’ execution, on
these facts, would undermine public conﬁdence in the fairness of
the judicial system.
What is the public to think when it learns that a man has
been executed after being represented by a lawyer who, in effect,
switched sides, that the lawyer did so with the imprimatur of the
courts, but without telling his client, and that when this unethical
and unseemly conduct came to light, the client was told it is he
who must prove how this profound conﬂict affected his lawyer’s
performance? Surely the public will conclude that this defendant
has been betrayed not once, but twice, ﬁrst when this lawyer was
assigned and second when he, the injured client, was saddled
with the onerous burden of proving adverse effect. But the public will also conclude that the system has been betrayed in a way
that undermines conﬁdence not just in the result in this case, but
in all future cases.
As this Court recognized in Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S.
153 (1988), the “Federal courts have an independent interest in
ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to
all who observe them.” Id. at 160. The public expects, as it
should, that when an accused is brought before a court the
accused has the undivided loyalty of counsel. Anything less than
guardianship by the courts for loyalty of counsel undermines not
only the lawyer-client relationship, but also public support for the
justice system.
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I.

BECAUSE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF A
LAWYER’S DUTY OF LOYALTY, CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST ARE DIFFERENT BOTH IN DEGREE
AND IN KIND FROM OTHER ETHICAL AND
REPRESENTATIONAL FAILURES.
A.

A L AWYER ’ S L OYALTY TO HIS C LIENT H AS
ALWAYS BEEN HIS FIRST DUTY — FROM THE
VERY BEGINNING OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
THROUGH ITS UNIVERSAL APPLICATION TODAY.

Recognition of the importance of lawyer loyalty has been
eloquently expressed for centuries. In 1820, in one of its most
famous articulations, Lord Brougham described the obligation to
serve the client:
[A]n advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his
client, knows . . . [t]o save that client, by all expedient
means, to protect that client, at all hazards and cost to
all others . . . .
H ENRY L ORD B ROUGHAM , S PEECHES OF H ENRY L ORD
BROUGHAM 63 (1841), quoted in Steven H. Goldberg, The
Former Client’s Disqualiﬁcation Gambit: A Bad Move in Pursuit
of an Ethical Anomaly, 72 MINN. L. REV. 227, 228 n.18 (1987).
In 1824, Chief Justice Story delineated the terms of the duty of
loyalty owed by a lawyer to his client:
I agree to the doctrine urged at the bar, as to the delicacy of the relation of client and attorney, and the duty
of a full, frank, and free disclosure by the latter of
every circumstance, which may be presumed to be
material, not merely to the interests, but to the fair
exercise of the judgment, of the client. An attorney is
bound to disclose to his client every adverse retainer,
and even every prior retainer, which may affect the
discretion of the latter. No man can be supposed to be
indifferent to the knowledge of facts, which work
directly on his interests, or bear on the freedom of his
choice of counsel. When a client employs an attorney,
he has a right to presume, if the latter be silent on the
point, that he has no engagements, which interfere, in
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any degree, with his exclusive devotion to the cause
conﬁded to him; that he has no interest, which may
betray his judgment, or endanger his ﬁdelity.
Williams v. Reed, 29 F. Cas. 1386, 1390 (C.C.D. Me. 1824).
This Court recognized early on that courts were obliged to
monitor the behavior of the lawyers before them to ensure that
the lawyer’s duty of loyalty was fulﬁlled:
There are few of the business relations of life involving
a higher trust and conﬁdence than that of attorney and
client, or, generally speaking, one more honorably and
faithfully discharged; few more anxiously guarded by
the law, or governed by sterner principles of morality
and justice; and it is the duty of the court to administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful
and industrious, to see that conﬁdence thus reposed
shall not be used to the detriment or prejudice of the
rights of the party bestowing it.
Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. 232, 247 (Dec. Term, 1850).
Every state bar has an ethical rule prohibiting a lawyer from
undertaking a representation that involves a conﬂict of interest.
See NATIONAL REPORTER ON LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Vols. I − IV, generally (University
Publ’ns of Am. 2001)(reprinting the codes of professional responsibility for all ﬁfty states). Most of these rules are derived from,
or literally copied from the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility or the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. While
ethics codes vary in their particulars from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, they all condemn Saunders’ conduct here.
B.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ARE DIFFERENT IN
DEGREE AND IN KIND FROM OTHER ETHICAL VIOLATIONS AND FAILURES IN REPRESENTATION.

Conﬂicts of interest infect the lawyer-client relationship in
subtle ways, leaving the entire representation suspect. As this
Court has recognized, a legal representation “contains a myriad of
occasions for the exercise of discretion, each of which goes to
shape the record in a case, but few of which are part of the
record.” Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 812-13 (1987)
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(discussing the effect of a non-disinterested prosecutor). Unlike
other ethical or representational failures, which are discrete and
whose effects are manifest and readily measured, a conﬂict of
interest casts a shadow over every aspect of the lawyer-client
relationship.
A breach of the duty of loyalty is worse than other ethical
breaches because it is a breach of the most fundamental duty
owed to a client. It is also a substantively different type of breach
because it affects invisibly every decision in the representation.
Depending on the conﬂict and the representation, this breach can
blunt a lawyer’s advocacy, undermine a lawyer’s independent professional judgment, and inhibit a lawyer’s creativity and zeal. A
suspect representation, which could have failed in so many places
and at so many levels, produces a verdict that has not been
adequately tested by the adversarial process and, thus, cannot be
trusted.
While unrevealed conﬂicts always cast these shadows on the
representation, the problem is particularly acute in criminal representations, especially capital cases. There is no way to recreate
what might have, could have, or should have happened if the
accused were represented by a lawyer with undivided loyalty. The
defense of capital cases is an art, not a science. Each case is literally unique. The decision-tree from retainer to ﬁnal appeal
includes hundreds of branches — dead ends, false starts and
choices, ranging from the minor — do I ask one more question
on cross-examination? — to the major — should the client
defend on self-defense or insanity? As a result, when confronted
with a case involving a conﬂict of interest violation this Court
must be particularly sensitive to the harm the client suffered and
to the damage to the system of justice any failure to remediate
the ethical lapse will cause.
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II.

UNDER ANY ANALYSIS, SAUNDERS’ CONFLICT
OF INTEREST SHOULD BE COGNIZABLE UNDER
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT.
A.

SIXTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE IS HAMSTRUNG BECAUSE IT LACKS A CLEAR AND EASILY
APPLIED DEFINITION OF CONFLICT.

The Sixth Amendment case law addressing when conﬂicts of
interest are constitutionally cognizable often attempts to distinguish (or seems to) between conﬂicts that are “actual” or “real”,
and those that are “potential” or “technical.” It is the view of
amici that such distinctions are not really helpful, are not found
in the rules governing the legal profession and should be set aside
in favor of an approach squarely based on the rules of professional conduct. These rules merely inquire whether a conﬂict of
interest exists. If it does, they bar the representation.
The various opinions in this case alone reveal a bewildering
number of competing concepts: conﬂict of interest; actual conﬂict; technical conﬂict; potential conﬂict; apparent conﬂict; genuine conﬂict; actually representing conﬂicting interests; possible
conﬂict; a conﬂict that never ripened into an actual conﬂict; a
conﬂict of interest that actually affected the adequacy of representation; a client actually saddled with a genuine conﬂict; and,
ﬁnally, a conﬂict of interest that actually existed. And an analysis
of other case law demonstrates that these various formulations
are anything but aberrational.2
2. Numerous trial and appellate courts have stumbled over claims of ineffective representation based on conﬂicts of interest because the courts lack a
clear and useful deﬁnition for a conﬂict. See, e.g., (in order of Courts of Appeal),
United States v. Sotomayor-Vazquez, 249 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2001) (“To show an
actual conﬂict of interest, the defendant must show that ‘the lawyer could have
pursued a plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic’ and that ‘the alternative strategy or tactic was inherently in conﬂict with or not undertaken due to
the attorney’s other interests or loyalties.’”); Amiel v. United States, 209 F.3d
195, 198 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that an actual conﬂict occurs when a lawyer and
client’s interest “diverge with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a
course of action”); Hess v. Mazurkiewicz, 135 F.3d 905, 910 (3d Cir. 1998)
(same); Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775, 801-02 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that an
actual conﬂict occurs when a lawyer places himself in a situation “inherently
conducive to divided loyalties,” and claimant shows “something more”); United
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These competing concepts obscure and confuse what should
be a straightforward approach to determining whether conﬂicts of
interest cognizable under the Sixth Amendment are present in
any given case. Amici submit that the approach they suggest
below will eliminate the underlying confusion and clarify the
standard for ﬁnding a conﬂict.
B.

THE WELL ESTABLISHED ETHICAL STANDARD FOR
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST SHOULD BE APPLIED IN
THESE CASES.

In the view of amici, an analysis of this case should spring
from the universal and longstanding ethical rules of the profession, rules that this court has recognized many times in the past
to inform itself of the proper standards it should adopt in the
Sixth Amendment context. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United
States, 524 U.S. 399, 406-07 (1998); Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160; Nix
v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165-66 (1986); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U.S. 335, 346 (1980); see also Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344,
367 n.12 (1990) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
States v. Hall, 200 F.3d 962, 965-66 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Court will
not ﬁnd an actual conﬂict unless claimants “can point to ‘speciﬁc instances in the
record to suggest an actual conﬂict or impairment of their interests’”); Stoia v.
United States, 22 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 1994) (“An actual conﬂict of interest
results if the defense attorney was required to make a choice advancing his own
interests to the detriment of his client’s interests.”); Nave v. Delo, 62 F.3d 1024,
1034 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that the claimant must show “that his counsel
actively represented conﬂicting interests”); United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d
1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that an actual conﬂict is one that adversely
affects the defense lawyer’s performance); United States v. Migliaccio, 34 F.3d
1517, 1526 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Defense counsel’s performance [is] adversely
affected by an actual conﬂict of interest if a speciﬁc and seemingly valid or
genuine alternative strategy was available to defense counsel, but it was inherently in conﬂict with his duties to others or to his own personal interests.”);
Reynolds v. Chapman, No. 00-12207, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 13493, at *15
(11th Cir. June 15, 2001) (holding that a claimant must show “inconsistent interests” and show that his counsel “acted in some way that reﬂected the reality of
these conﬂicting interests.”); United States v. Taylor, 139 F.3d 924, 930 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (holding that “the defendant’s burden is to show that counsel actually
acted in a manner that adversely affected his representation by doing something,
or refraining from doing something, that a non-conﬂicted counsel would not
have done”); People v. McDonald, 496 N.E.2d 844, 847 (N.Y. 1986) (holding
that an actual conﬂict is one that bears a “substantial relation” to the defense).
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It is noteworthy that in none of the generally accepted ethical formulations — the Model Code, the Model Rules, the
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers — do the words
“actual”, “potential”, “real” or “technical” appear. It is also noteworthy that none requires proof of an actual adverse effect.
Rather, each reﬂects an obligation to identify the lawyer’s diverging interests: The Model Code refers to the lawyer’s “own ﬁnancial, business, property, or personal” and “differing interests.”
M ODEL C ODE OF P ROF ’ L R ESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(A),
5-105(A) (1983) [hereinafter “MODEL CODE”]. The Model Rules
refer to “responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or
by the lawyer’s own interests.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2001) [hereinafter “MODEL RULES”]. The
Restatement refers to a “lawyer’s own interests” or “the lawyer’s
duties to another current client, a former client, or a third person.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 121 (American Law Institute 1999) [hereinafter “RLGL”].
But ﬁnding differing interests between lawyer and client,
while necessary to ﬁnding a conﬂict of interest, is not in itself sufﬁcient. These formulations also include terms of limitation
designed to assure that an ethically cognizable conﬂict is not a
trivial or immaterial matter. In the Model Code, the terms of
limitation are that “the exercise of” the lawyer’s “professional
judgment will be or reasonably may be affected” by these other
interests, see MODEL CODE DR 5-101(A); alternatively the exercise of professional judgment “will be or is likely to be adversely
affected” by the proffered employment “or it would likely involve
him in representing” differing interests. See MODEL CODE DR
5-105(A). In the Model Rules, the standard is whether the representation “may be materially limited.” MODEL RULE 1.7(b).
Finally, the Restatement captures — and, in the view of amici,
captures best — these terms of limitation when it refers to the
existence of “a substantial risk that the lawyer’s representation of
the client would be materially and adversely affected” by the
other interests or duties. See RLGL, § 121.
Signiﬁcantly, the analysis under the generally accepted legal
ethics conception does not require an “adverse” effect on the
representation. Rather, the analysis focuses on the risk of materially divergent interests and the risk of an adverse effect. “In the
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modern view, a conﬂict of interest exists whenever the attorneyclient relationship or the quality of the representation is ‘at risk,’
even if no substantive impropriety — such as a breach of conﬁdentiality or less than zealous representation — in fact eventuates. The law of lawyering then proceeds by assessing the risk and
providing an appropriate response.” GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.
& W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 10.4, at
10-11 (3d ed. 2001) (citations omitted). This provides courts with
an objective test to determine whether a lawyer is burdened with
a conﬂict. That test is reﬂected in the following question: did the
lawyer have other interests that posed a substantial risk of materially and adversely affecting the representation? Applying this
standard to Mickens’ representation by Saunders we can recognize the conﬂicts of interest with little difﬁculty.
C.

SAUNDERS WAS BURDENED WITH MULTIPLE DIVERGENT INTERESTS THAT PRESENTED A SUBSTANTIAL
RISK OF MATERIALLY AND ADVERSELY AFFECTING
MICKENS’S REPRESENTATION.
1.

SAUNDERS WAS SUBJECT
DIVERGENT INTERESTS.

TO

MULTIPLE

This case involves not one, but several divergent interests.
These divergent interests can be divided into two categories:
those that involved Saunders’ other client, Hall, and those that
were simply personal to Saunders.
Saunders owed two related but separate duties to Hall: a
duty to keep his conﬁdences and a more pervasive duty of loyalty.
The codes of ethics are uniform in providing that a lawyer’s duty
to keep conﬁdences continues after the lawyer-client relationship
is terminated. Indeed, the lawyer’s duty to protect his client’s
conﬁdences survives even the client’s death. Swidler & Berlin,
524 U.S. at 410-11. The district court below identiﬁed four conﬁdences from Hall, each of which Saunders was bound not to
reveal under the applicable provision of the Virginia Code Professional Responsibility DR 4-101.3 See Mickens v. Greene, 74 F.
3. These were: (a) Hall had been charged with carrying a concealed
weapon at the intersection of 27th Street and Marshall in Newport News; (b)
Hall’s mother had pressed charges against him for assault; (c) Hall was not liv-
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Supp. 2d 586, 599, 606 (E.D. Va. 1999) (citing transcript of Saunders’ deposition taken on December 23, 1998).
Saunders also owed Hall a duty of loyalty. This duty is
reﬂected in the professional rules that provide that a lawyer may
not take on a representation (in this case Mickens) that may be
materially limited by the lawyer’s duties to others (in this case
Hall) or to himself. Given that Sanders represented Hall at the
very date of his death, this material limitation becomes likely. Its
likelihood is increased by the fact that the character and conduct
of the victim were clearly at issue — a condition that is present
in every capital case because of the free range of inquiry at the
penalty phase of the proceeding and that was particularly pertinent here because of the circumstances of this crime.
Saunders also labored under at least two personal divergent
interests: a pecuniary interest in the representation and an interest in escaping disciplinary proceedings. When he was offered the
opportunity to take on this matter Saunders said nothing to the
Court about his role as a defense counsel to Hall on charges that
had been dropped the prior Friday and, once his silence failed to
prevent the Court from making an appointment the Court knew
or should have known was suffused with a conﬂict of interest,
Saunders needed to maintain silence in order to keep it.
While almost all lawyers have a pecuniary interest in their
clients — lawyers must make a living — Saunders’ interest in the
Mickens representation moved beyond the ordinary. This was a
high-proﬁle capital representation that, unlike the juvenile court
representations with which Saunders had apparently been supporting himself, had the advantages of enhancing his prestige and
visibility. It also paid a higher hourly rate and imposed no fee cap
on the total amount he could charge. See VIRGINIA CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-163 (Michie 1992).
NOTES (Continued)
ing with his mother at the time of his death; (d) Saunders had discussed with
Hall “the circumstances surrounding each of the charged crimes.” In addition,
the very existence of juvenile charges against Hall was conﬁdential since in Virginia juvenile court records are sealed absent a court order. See VA. CODE ANN
§ 16.1-305 (Michie 1992); Mickens, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
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This interest was only exacerbated by Saunders’ other personal interest: to avoid professional discipline. Once Saunders
undertook Mickens’ representation he had violated the Virginia
Code of Professional Responsibility in at least three respects.
First, he had not been candid with the tribunal about the representation of Hall. See VIRGINIA CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A) (Michie 1992). Second, he had failed to disclose
the prior representation to his new client, Mickens. See id. EC
7-8, EC 5-19. Third, he had undertaken a conﬂicting representation on an undisclosed basis. See id. DR 5-105(C); see also Dowell v. Commonwealth, 351 S.E.2d 915, 917-18 (Va. Ct. App.
1987). It is all these obvious and serious divergent interests that
serve as a predicate for the next part of the analysis.
2.

SAUNDERS’ DIVERGENT INTERESTS
RIAL AND ADVERSE, AND POSED A
RISK TO MICKENS’ REPRESENTATION.

WERE MATESUBSTANTIAL

If any of Saunders’ divergent interests, either separately or
cumulatively, were material, adverse and caused a substantial risk
to Mickens’ representation, then Saunders labored under conflict.
To be “material”, the interest must pose a risk to one of a lawyer’s
duties to his current client (i.e. Mickens); to be “adverse”, the
interest must pose a risk that it will create an incentive for the
lawyer to do something not in his client’s best interest. See RLGL
§ 121 cmt. c(i & ii). A “substantial risk” has been deﬁned by the
case law as a risk that is signiﬁcant and plausible, even if it were
not certain or even probable that injury will occur. See RLGL
§ 121 cmt. c(iii). Thus, Saunders’ divergent interests burdened
him with a conﬂict if any or all of those interests diverged from
Mickens’ on any aspect of the case, and thereby posed a signiﬁcant and plausible risk to the representation.
While it is thus critical to evaluate the divergent interests
against these three standards, “material,” “adverse” and “substantial risk,” it is unnecessary, and, in fact, unhelpful, to rely on the
record of trial to determine these issues. Rather, the ethical rules
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examine these questions prospectively, which is how this Court
should examine them — from the point where the interests
began to diverge.4
The existence of a conﬂict here can be illustrated by evaluating Saunders’ duty to examine and investigate the nature and
circumstances of the crime thoroughly in order to determine the
best lines of defense.5 Each of Saunders’ divergent interests —
his duty of conﬁdentiality and loyalty to Hall, his pecuniary interest in the representation, and his interest in avoiding disciplinary
proceedings — created the same incentive: to avoid investigating
Hall at all. This fundamentally sabotaged Saunders’ pre-trial
preparation because he was compelled to make judgments based
not on objective and dispassionate strategy but, instead, upon
considering his own situation and concerns — forces with which
an unconﬂicted lawyer would not be saddled.
First, Saunders was barred from revealing any conﬁdential
information regarding Hall. This crippled Saunders’ pre-trial
investigation from its inception and was clearly not in Mickens’
best interest. Any and all facts regarding the crime must be gathered, even if they are rendered unimportant and the approaches
they suggest are discarded in favor of better strategies later. A
lawyer cannot make the best choice if he systematically ignores
crucial information. By itself, Saunders’ duty to keep Hall’s
secrets posed a plausible, signiﬁcant risk to Saunders’ ability to
perform an adequate pre-trial investigation, thereby creating a
conﬂict.
Second, Saunders’ duty of loyalty to Hall affected his ability
to advocate zealously for Mickens. While the multiple ways that
loyalty interest affected the representation might be harder to
4. In fact, reliance on the record of the trial to determine that the interests
were material, adverse and posed a substantial risk to the relationship will twist
the analysis and systematically cause courts to underestimate the negative effect
of these interests because the sins of conﬂict are sins of omission that leave a
record bereft of evidence. See infra at pp. 18-21.
5. “Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction.” ABA STANDARDS OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-4-1(a) (1993). This is not to say that Saunders’ divergent
interests did not affect his other duties to Mickens, but the corruption of one
material duty demonstrates that Saunders operated under a conﬂict of interest.
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pinpoint, several courts that have examined a case where the lawyer for the defendant also represented the victim have expressed
the appropriate level of concern about the conﬂicts of interest
thus presented. See Castillo v. Estelle, 504 F.2d 1243, 1245 (5th
Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Miller v. Myers, 253 F. Supp. 55,
57 (E.D. Pa. 1966); People v. McDonald, 496 N.E.2d 844 (N.Y.
1986); State v. Aguilar, 536 P.2d 263 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975).
That the Courts respond this way is not surprising because it
is difﬁcult to imagine Saunders’ loyalty to Hall as not having a
profound effect on Mickens’ representation. Saunders is
appointed to represent Hall on serious charges. If Saunders is like
any other lawyer, he immediately prepares to defend Hall, learning the facts of the case, meeting with the client, assessing the
charges, preparing to advocate on his behalf. Saunders then knew
Hall not as a docket number and a mug shot, but as an individual
reposing his trust in Saunders to act in his best interests, defending him against the charges, learning Hall’s version of the events
in conversations cloaked with conﬁdentiality.
Suddenly Hall was the victim of a brutal homicide whose
alleged perpetrator, Mickens, Saunders is defending against the
charges of murder. Now Saunders is obliged to investigate all the
disparaging, humiliating, and potentially criminal behavior of Hall
from the time when Hall was still his client. And he must do so
against the backdrop of whatever feelings of sadness, anger and
retribution Saunders — no matter how difﬁdent he now seems —
then feels about his client’s tragic death, as well as against whatever commitment of loyalty, no matter how subconscious, Saunders still has toward the deceased. While no one will ever know
— perhaps not even Saunders — what effect all that had, it is
hard to conceive it did not have a signiﬁcant effect on Saunders’
representation of Mickens.
Third, Saunders’ pecuniary and reputational interests only
reinforced the incentives created by his conﬂicting duties to Hall.
Even if Saunders did not recognize his obligations to Hall as a
former client, he certainly recognized his own self-interest in
keeping the prior representation of Hall a secret — a fact that
would be revealed as soon as Saunders attempted to conduct any
of the investigation of the victim, especially any investigation of
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Hall’s family and associates, the very people who would have
known of the prior conﬂicting representation.
The need to conduct a complete pre-trial factual investigation, the serious consideration necessary to decide whether to
place the victim’s conduct at issue in the guilt phase, and the
absolute requirement of lessening sympathy for the victim in the
penalty phase yielded a high risk, even a certainty, that the representation would be adversely affected. And it turned out that
Saunders failed to undertake the investigation of or address Hall’s
conduct or character in any aspect of the trial — omissions so
glaring that their only explanation was Saunders’ recognition of
the conﬂict. And since the effect of those divergent interests —
maintaining silence; doing no investigation; not trying the victim
or even diminishing sympathy for him — was the same as that
created by Saunders’ other conﬂicts of interest, by deﬁnition
these personal interests, created a signiﬁcant risk of an adverse
effect on the representation of Mickens that unfortunately was
realized as the representation unfolded.
3.

THE EN BANC OPINION ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF
SAUNDERS’ DIVIDED INTERESTS IS FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED.

In rejecting the idea that Saunders’ divergent interests could
play any role in Mickens’ defense, the Court of Appeals majority
opinion relied on the testimony of Saunders dismissing such concerns. While Saunders might have believed his allegiance to Hall
“ended when [he] walked into the courtroom and they told [him],
[Hall] was dead and the case was gone,” see Mickens, 74 F. Supp.
2d at 605, Saunders’ bald assertion to that effect cannot overcome
a charge of subconscious bias. See In re Williams, 309 N.E.2d
579, 581 (Ill. 1974); see also Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 41011; People v. Thomas, 545 N.E.2d 654 (Ill. 1989); San Diego Cty.
Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 1993-2 (1994) (holding that a law
ﬁrm cannot represent a man accused of murdering a former
(obviously dead) client).
Furthermore, Saunders’ assertion that he believed there was
no conﬂict is belied by his concealment of his relationship to Hall.
If Saunders did not believe he owed any duties — including a
duty to keep conﬁdences — to Hall, why did he not disclose to
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his client, his co-counsel, or the court that up until his former client’s unfortunate death, he had been representing the victim,
Hall? Saunders silence about Hall through the course of trial,
appeal, remand, resentencing, another appeal and state postconviction review simply deﬁes a benign explanation.
D.

MICKENS COULD NOT BE ASKED TO CONSENT TO
SAUNDERS’ CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.

A critical circumstance in this case is that throughout the
course of the trial and appeal in the state courts, Mickens was
unaware of the conﬂicts that affected Saunders’ representation of
him. But assuming he had known and the trial court had offered
him the opportunity to waive the conﬂicts — instead of simply
appointing other, unconﬂicted counsel — Mickens could not have
given the required consent.
First, in order to secure from Mickens effective consent to
the conﬂict, Saunders would have been forced to disclose to
Mickens his prior representation of Hall. But that fact, without
more, was conﬁdential, not only because all juvenile court records
in Virginia are sealed, but also because it was a secret under the
ethics code and, therefore, non-disclosable. See VA. CODE OF
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (Michie 1992). When a lawyer cannot disclose enough information to permit the client to
consent after consultation, the result is that the lawyer must simply decline proceeding further. See RLGL § 122 cmt. c(i) (“if
means of adequate disclosure are unavailable, consent to the conﬂict may not be obtained”).
Second, even if Saunders could have disclosed the fact of his
representation of Hall, he could not have disclosed the conﬁdential information about the representation necessary to permit Mr.
Mickens to make a judgment whether this conﬂict was one he
was willing to waive. In order for a waiver to be effective it must
be fully informed, and the court must have been able to warn the
defendant both of his right to alternate counsel and of the “potential hazards posed by the conﬂict of interest.” United States v.
Rodriguez, 929 F.2d 747, 750 (1st Cir. 1991). Courts must invalidate waivers when they are secured based on misrepresentations
or inadequate disclosure of the potential consequences. See, e.g.,
State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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Third, the standard test to determine if a conﬂict is nonwaiveable is whether a “disinterested lawyer would conclude that
the client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances.” MODEL RULES 1.7 cmt. 5; see also Burger v. Kemp,
483 U.S. 776, 810-11 (1987) (Blackmun, J. dissenting). If so, “the
lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client’s consent.” Kelley’s
Case, 627 A.2d 597, 600 (N.H. 1993).
The non-waiveability of this conﬂict is best demonstrated by
considering what conversation would have been required
between Saunders and Mickens had a waiver been sought. Saunders would have been forced to explain to Mickens — whose life
was literally on the line — that he, Saunders, was perfectly happy
to represent Mickens, but Mickens would have to understand
that, in undertaking the representation, Saunders would not be
able to conduct a full pre-trial investigation into the character and
conduct of Hall, that Mickens would not be able to put the victim on trial at all and that Saunders would be barred from challenging any characterization of Hall as other than a person worthy of the jury’s highest sympathies. Moreover, Saunders would
have to tell Mickens that he could not inform him the reason for
the limitations he was imposing on the representation. No reasonable lawyer, in good conscience, could ask a client to accept these
restrictions when any other lawyer assigned to the case could
proceed unfettered. Moreover, no client could give informed consent to the request and no court could have accepted it.
III.

REQUIRING MICKENS TO SHOW THE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ALSO HAD AN ADVERSE
EFFECT WOULD BE IN DIRECT CONFLICT
WITH THE TREATMENT OF CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST UNDER GENERALLY ACCEPTED
PRINCIPLES OF LEGAL ETHICS.

The court below holds, in substance, that an actual conﬂict
unknown and necessarily unconsented to by the defendant — and
unnoticed by the court responsible for creating the conﬂict — is
of no legal consequence unless the defendant can prove that the
conﬂict in fact injured his lawyer’s representation of him. Under
generally accepted ethics principles, on the other hand, in the
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absence of disclosure and the client’s informed consent, “a lawyer
may not represent a client if the representation would involve a
conﬂict of interest.” RLGL § 121 (emphasis supplied); see also
MODEL RULES 1.7. (“A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client may be materially limited by the
lawyer’s [undisclosed] responsibilities to another client or to a
third party.” (emphasis supplied)). Surely these latter principles,
for the reasons set forth below, provide the sounder rule for
ensuring that clients receive the level of loyalty to which they are
entitled.
A.

R EQUIRING AN A DVERSE E FFECT A NALYSIS IS
COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE BECAUSE IT COMPROMISES
A CLIENT’S TRUST.

Client conﬁdence is repeatedly cited as a central reason for
a strict prohibition of conﬂicts of interest and that principle has
constitutional implications. Instilling conﬁdence is an objective
important in itself because “mutual trust” is “necessary for effective representation,” State v. Jones, 923 P.2d 560, 566 (Mont.
1996), for “[i]t is essential to our adversary system that a client’s
ability to communicate freely and in conﬁdence with his counsel
be maintained inviolate.” United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson,
555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977). A client’s distrust of his lawyer
may become so severe that it alone may render the lawyer incapable of providing constitutionally adequate representation. See
Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1970); Romero v.
Furlong, 215 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2000).
The ethical principle that bars a lawyer from engaging in a
representation when the lawyer’s undisclosed interests put the
client at risk “seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent them with undivided loyalty,” RLGL § 121 cmt. b. The assurance provided by the rules of ethics is intended “[t]o promote
conﬁdence between the accused and his attorney,” Zarychta v.
State, No. 14-99-00145 CR, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 1752, at *4
(Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2001).
A constitutional rule entitling defendants to representation
free from undisclosed conﬂicts tends to bolster client conﬁdence
— a goal this Court has endorsed, see Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) — by giving defendants greater assur-
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ance that their lawyers have made full disclosure. A rule such as
that contemplated by the en banc majority of the Court of
Appeals — which puts the burden on a betrayed client to prove
that the betrayal actually did him harm, and leaving unremedied
conﬂicts of interest whose harm, though real, cannot be proved
— can hardly be conducive to client trust.
By recognizing a right against covert conﬂicted representation, the state assures the defendant that it is “[his constitutional]
prerogative . . . rather than [the prerogative of] his [conﬂicted]
counsel to decide whether he [will] accept the risk that counsel’s
trial strategy [will be] devised not in his interest, but in the interest of [another].” McDonald, 496 N.E.2d at 849. As between the
rule embraced by the en banc majority below and one recognizing a constitutional right to counsel free from undisclosed conﬂicts, the latter creates optimal conditions for the “mutual trust
[that is] necessary to effective representation,” United States ex
rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977).
B.

UNDISCLOSED CONFLICTS OF INTEREST SYSTEMATICALLY CREATE AN IMPOVERISHED RECORD THAT
RENDERS THE ADVERSE EFFECT ANALYSIS USELESS.

If the decision at the en banc court below, requiring a showing of adverse effect even for undisclosed conﬂicts, is to be
enshrined in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, there will be an
undeterminable number of injured defendants whose representation is adversely affected by counsel’s conﬂict, but who are unable
to prove that effect, and who in consequence are unable to secure
a Sixth Amendment remedy. This approach contrasts sharply with
the approach followed by other lower courts and by applicable
rules of professional responsibility, that a defendant has a right to
a lawyer who is untainted by undisclosed risk-imposing conﬂicts
of interest.
A breach of loyalty may be apparent, but this Court and the
lower courts have repeatedly recognized that the effects of a
breach are not: “it is difﬁcult to measure the precise effect on the
defense of representation corrupted by conﬂicting interests.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. Other courts agree, observing that
when a defense lawyer has a conﬂict of interest, “the prejudice
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may be subtle, even unconscious.” Castillo, 504 F.2d 1245.
Because a cold record cannot be expected to disclose “the erosion
of zeal which may ensue from divided loyalty,” id., the Castillo
Court refused to require that the defendant identify speciﬁc
instances in which his lawyer’s conﬂicting loyalties adversely
affected his representation.
Numerous lower courts have concurred in this view.6 Once a
defendant has shown that his defense counsel had undisclosed
interests that created a substantial risk of undermining the representation, and that the trial court failed to inquire into the manifest potential conﬂict, the better-reasoned lower court decisions
have concluded that “[i]t is unfair to the accused, for who can
determine whether his representation was affected, at least, subliminally, by the conﬂict.” People v. Stoval, 239 N.E.2d 441, 444
(Ill. 1968);7 cf. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942)
(“The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental
6. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 209 F.3d 139, 146 (2d Cir. 2000)
(“[T]he sorting out of the conﬂict issues after trial entails ﬁndings that, even if
they are sound enough to be sustained, represent intuitions about why some
steps were taken and others forgone, and the impact of what happened. Inevitably, the post-trial inquiry opens avenues for undetected conﬂicts and constitutional harms that could be foreclosed at the outset by an informed waiver or a
substitution of counsel.”); United States v. Malpiedi, 62 F.3d 465, 470 (2d Cir.
1995) (“[A]fter-the-fact testimony by a lawyer who was precluded by a conﬂict
of interest from pursuing a strategy or tactic is not helpful. Even the most candid persons may be able to convince themselves that they actually would not
have used that strategy or tactic anyway, when the alternative is a confession of
ineffective assistance resulting from ethical limitations.”); State v. Watson, 620
N.W.2d 233, 236 (Iowa 2000) (“A cold, dispassionate appellate transcript simply
cannot provide an adequate basis for assessing [defense counsel’s] performance,
for subtle variations in demeanor and depth of cross-examination cannot be
reﬂected in the pages of a transcript.”) (quoting Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436,
440 (5th Cir. 1979)); In re Richardson, 675 P.2d 209, 214 (Wash. 1983) (“[T]o
assess the impact of a conﬂict of interests on the attorney’s options, tactics, and
decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible. Thus, an inquiry
into a claim of harmless error here would require, unlike most cases, unguided
speculation.”); State v. Aguilar, 536 P.2d 263, 264 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) (quoting Castillo).
7. In declining to require that defendants demonstrate an adverse effect in
addition to an undisclosed conﬂict, some courts go beyond evidentiary concerns;
they suggest that, at least where a trial court has failed to inquire, there can be
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and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to
the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.”).
In Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787 (1987), and Wheat
v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988), two cases that examine
lawyer conﬂicts from different perspectives, this Court has
endorsed disqualiﬁcation when a trial court ﬁnds a conﬂict without requiring an adverse effect or other impact analysis. See
Young, 481 U.S. at 812-13; Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164. In both cases,
the Court found that the pervasive and insidious nature of conﬂicts made an adverse impact analysis impractical or impossible.
In Young, this Court observed:
Appointment of an interested prosecutor is also an
error whose effects are pervasive. Such an appointment calls into question, and therefore requires scrutiny of, the conduct of an entire prosecution, rather
than simply a discrete prosecutorial decision. Determining the effect of this appointment thus would be
extremely difﬁcult. A prosecution contains a myriad of
occasions for the exercise of discretion, each of which
goes to shape the record in a case, but few of which are
part of the record.
Young, 481 U.S. at 812-13. The Young Court was unwilling to
apply either a harmless error analysis or to require proof of actual
prejudice in the case of a non-disinterested prosecutor. 8
NOTES (Continued)
no harmless conﬂict. See, e.g., U.S. v. Malpiedi, 62 F.3d 465, 469 (2d Cir. 1995)
(“Counsel’s inability to make . . . a conﬂict-free decision is itself a lapse in representation.”).
8. It is not beside the point to note the irony that under the learning in
Young, Saunders, as Hall’s lawyer, could never have been appointed a special
prosecutor of Mickens. If that is so then, a fortiori, Saunders should not be able
to represent Mickens. At least in the former case Saunders would have been on
the same side of the matter, if you will, pressing charges against a person who
allegedly victimized his client. His sympathies would naturally be with the prosecution and, indeed, it is concern about how strong those sympathies might be
that would lead to the disqualiﬁcation of the lawyer for the vicitm. But to ask
that same lawyer, in effect, to switch sides is likely to have an even more unfortunate effect on the integrity of the representation than that which animated the
Court in Young.
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In Wheat, the Court weighed the conﬂicting Sixth Amendment interests of conﬂict free counsel and a defendant’s right to
counsel of his choice. 486 U.S. at 159. This Court found that the
trial court had not abused its discretion by declining Wheat’s
waiver of his lawyer’s conﬂict. Id. at 164. In contrast to the
present case, the Wheat Court was balancing two important Sixth
Amendment rights. Nevertheless, it concluded that proof of a
mere potential conﬂict could demand disqualiﬁcation. The
present circumstances are all the more compelling.
The injurious effects of a lawyer’s external interests tend to
defy detection and measurement; only by prohibiting the nonconsensual imposition on a client of a substantial risk of those effects
can courts weed out unconstitutional convictions.
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C.

EVEN IF THE APPROACH TO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST EMBODIED IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
IS NOT APPLIED MORE GENERALLY IN INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CASES, IT IS CLEARLY APPROPRIATE IN THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE.

Any conclusion about the proper remedial approach to a
conﬂict of interest in any event should not place any burden to
prove adverse effect on a client who endured an undisclosed conﬂict. When a conﬂict is disclosed — for example when the client
objected but relief was denied — the client is at least on notice
of the facts that gave rise to the request for different counsel, will
view his lawyer’s conduct through that prism, fully aware of the
potential burden under which the lawyer is operating, and can
document for later use those decisions and actions that the client
believes may have been infected by the conﬂict. So, too, a court
that either denied disqualiﬁcation or knows of the denial can be
alert to how the affected lawyer handles the defense and will
retain the right of disqualiﬁcation. While such opportunities are
hardly a substitute for a correct initial decision on whether a lawyer should have been disqualiﬁed, they do highlight a major difference between cases in which the conﬂict was disclosed and
ones in which it was not.
Where the conﬂict is hidden, the client assumes that he or
she is receiving representation predicated on undivided loyalty.
The client perceives a relationship characterized by trust and
conﬁdence. As a result the client will have no reason to be alert
to possible problems. When the conﬂict of interest is ﬁnally disclosed, any attempt to reconstruct the effects of the conﬂicted
representation will be impaired dramatically by the false sense of
security induced by the non-disclosure.
Thus, the undisclosed conﬂicts case is even worse than the
situation brought to the Court in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S.
475 (1978). In both situations, the conﬂict of interest produces an
impoverished record, but in the undisclosed conﬂict situation, the
defendant is helpless to mitigate the effect. It follows that placing
the burden of proving adverse effect on Mickens subjects him to
a harsher standard, even though he is in a more vulnerable
position.
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IV.

EVEN IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT AN
ADVERSE EFFECT ANALYSIS IS REQUIRED, THE
COURT SHOULD STILL GRANT REFLIEF
BECAUSE THE EN BANC OPINION IS FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED.

The en banc majority assumes arguendo that Saunders was
burdened by an actual conﬂict, but then concludes that it is of no
moment because Mickens was unable to establish an adverse
effect. See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 358 (4th Cir. 2001)
(en banc). The court concluded there was no adverse effect
because the information Saunders knew was irrelevant to Mickens’ defense, which was based on the assertion that Mickens was
not the perpetrator. See id. at 361.
This proposition, however, cannot be used to analyze the
propriety of Saunders’ conduct because it is, itself, tainted with
the conﬂict. Once it is assumed that Saunders was burdened with
the conﬂict, it also must be assumed that every decision made by
Saunders is suspect and cannot be trusted.9 That includes the
defense strategy itself.
First, a lawyer, unaffected by the conﬂict of interest, would
certainly have considered with his client trying a different
defense. Indeed, it is a lawyer’s obligation to explore all the alternatives. This is especially true when the result of a bad judgment
is not a client paying money she does not owe or serving a prison
sentence for a crime he did not commit, but a sentence of death.
Second, even if a client, guided by a lawyer, chooses the “I
didn’t do it” defense, he still must be free to challenge the prosecution’s case for failure to prove the alleged crimes beyond a
reasonable doubt. Here, this would include introducing evidence
about the victim at the guilt phase of the case — for example, to
demonstrate that the perpetrator may have been acting in selfdefense, given Hall’s propensity for violence and known possession of weapons, or that this was not a capital crime because the
alleged sodomy itself was consensual, and therefore, whoever perpetrated the crime would not be eligible for the death penalty.
9. This obviousness of the adverse effect in the instant litgation is all the
more surprising because of the systematic tendency of a conﬂict of interest to
hide and de-emphasize the effect. See supra, pp. 18-21.
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Even if all of the foregoing had left the defense taking the
same approach Saunders in fact took at the guilt phase of the
proceeding, it does not follow that the information about Hall
would not have been critical to the penalty phase. On this point
the en banc majority asserts that none of the information would
have been relevant because the approach taken was sympathy for
the victim’s family. See Mickens, 240 F.3d at 362. But that was the
approach chosen by a lawyer who had no choice because of his
conﬂict and by a client who did know he had a choice. If the
prosecution was going to be free to offer Hall’s mother’s testimony to explain her grief at losing her son to help the jury see its
way clear to sending Mickens to his death, then the defense had
to be free to conduct the investigation that would prepare it to
employ a strategy that asserted that a) she was not credible and
b) in any event, whether or not Hall’s mother testiﬁed, the victim
was not quite as worthy of the jury’s sympathy as the prosecution’s
presentation would indicate.
Because Saunders labored under a conﬂict, any adverse
effect analysis cannot rest on a facial determination of whether,
absent a conﬂict, Saunders’ choices were correct or even reasonable. Rather, an adverse effect analysis must begin with a blank
slate and ask the question: did the lawyer make choices in his client’s best interest or did the conﬂict adversely affect those
choices? In the present case, Saunders made a series of choices
that were based on Saunders’ divergent interests and not on what
was best for Mickens.
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CONCLUSION
The dynamics of litigation are far too subtle, the attorney’s role in that process is far too critical, and the
public’s interest in the outcome is far too great to leave
room for even the slightest doubt concerning the ethical propriety of a lawyer’s representation in a given
case.
Emle Industries v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir.
1973).
These quoted words sum up amici’s argument. It is amici’s
position that while the case of Walter Mickens does not present a
close question on the need to grant relief from the conﬂict of
interest he suffered, the way this Court crafts the grant of relief
can go a long way toward making the constitutional guarantee of
effective assistance of counsel embody the principles of the rules
governing the professional responsibility of lawyers. And if that is
done, not only will Mickens’ injuries be remedied, but also the
Court will bolster public conﬁdence in the fairness of our system
of justice.
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